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Comment
In Support of Education:
An Examination of the Parental
Obligation to Provide Postsecondary
Education in California
Education has come to play an increasingly important role in
modem society.' The California Supreme Court has established that
education is a fundamental interest under the California Constitu-
tion. 2 In contemporary society, postsecondary education is far more
important than in the past.3 Postsecondary education is especially
1. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (recognizing that education is a
matter of supreme importance); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (concluding
that education is perhaps the most important function of state and local government); Finn
v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 731 (Fla. 1975) (asserting that education is needed by individuals
seeking to be competitive).
2. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766 n.45, 557 P.2d 929, 951 n.45, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345, 367 n.45 (1976), cert. denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (affirming earlier
holding that education is a fundamental interest under California's equal protection clause).
Admittedly, characterizing education as a fundamental interest under article I, section 7 of
the California Constitution affords greater educational benefits to the citizens of California
than those dictated by the United States Constitution, for the United States Constitution
neither explicitly nor implicitly guarantees education. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1972). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the importance of education. Id. See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
3. Finn, 312 So. 2d at 731 (concluding that in an age of sophisticated technology and
economic complexity, individuals may need advanced education to be competitive). Cf. Strei-
twolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 573, 576, 43 A. 904, 907 (1899) (implying that education
beyond common school is a mere luxury).
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important in California, where higher education has contributed
greatly to economic and cultural growth.4
The growth in the importance of higher education in California
has been accompanied by an increase in the cost of higher education.'
Although parents generally assist their children with the costs of
postsecondary education, 6 children from families that have suffered
a marital dissolution are less likely to receive assistance with educa-
tional expenses from their parents. 7 The trend in child support
awards, therefore, has been toward including support for postsec-
ondary education."
The average student enrolled in a postsecondary institution is over
eighteen years of age and thus beyond the statutory age of majority
in most jurisdictions.9 The widespread reduction in the statutory age
of majority that occurred during the mid-1970s,' 0 therefore, under-
mined the authority of many courts to enter support orders covering
postsecondary education." In response to this problem, several states
4. See T. HAYDEN, A NEW VISION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA: BEYOND THE
MASTER PLAN 1 (1986) ("[h]igher education has been a strategic industry in the climb of
California to pre-eminence in innovation, economic growth, and cultural creativity").
5. See CAL. STUDENT AID COMM'N, FOURTEENTH BIENNIAL REP. 1 (1984). Between July
1982 and June 1984, the average cost of college, including fees and living expenses, rose by
an average of $1,176 at University of California campuses, $1,011 at California State University
campuses, and up to $2,887 at independent colleges. Id. In 1983-84, the costs of attending an
independent college in California ranged from a low of $5,662 for students living at home to
a high of $14,546 for students living in dorms. Id. at 2.
6. See Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 184, 244 P. 264, 267 (1926) (the law presumes a
custodial parent will provide for child's education).
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980) (recognizing
that even well-intentioned parents, when deprived of the custody of their children, react by
refusing to support them as they would have if the family unit had been preserved); Esleb,
138 Wash. at 184, 244 P. at 267 (concluding that parents deprived of custody often refuse to
do for their children what they ordinarily would do); S.B. 1129, 1985-86, 1st Reg. Sess., sec.
1 (Cal. 1985) (introduced March 7, 1985) [hereinafter cited as S.B. 1129]; S.B. 2065, 1985-86,
2nd Reg. Sess., sec. I (Cal. 1986) (introduced February 19, 1936) [hereinafter cited as S.B.
2065].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 63-103 (describing the trend in educational support
awards).
9. In the public schools of California, for example, children may embark on the twelve-
year course of elementary and secondary education only after reaching the age of live years
and nine months on or before September first of the school year in question. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48010 (Vest 1978). Thus, absent acceleration of the twelve-year program through
skipping grades, most public high school graduates attain age eighteen by the December
following their graduation from high school.
10. After ratification of the twenty-sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,
many states, including California, reduced the statutory age of majority to 18 years of age.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.1 (West 1982).
I1. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74. Generally, courts are empowered to order
parents to pay child support only for minor children except in cases of extraordinary need.
See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4700 (vest Supp. 1986) (court may order parent to pay support
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have passed legislation empowering courts to order support for adult
children who pursue postsecondary education.1 2
In the last several years, the judiciary in California has tacitly
endorsed the creation of a postsecondary support obligation for
parents whose marriages are dissolved by using indirect methods to
secure postmajority support in some cases. 3 In addition, the Cali-
fornia Legislature has manifested a desire to foster postsecondary
education by enabling certain classes of children to obtain parental
support for education beyond the age of majority. 14 Two bills de-
signed to give courts authority to continue parental child support
obligations beyond majority for children pursuing postsecondary
education have been introduced in the California Senate.' 5
The purpose of this comment is to examine the parental obligation
to provide postsecondary education in California.16 This examination
will focus on the legislation recently proposed in California'7 as a
medium for analysis of potential challenges to the effort to impose
a postmajority child support obligation upon parents whose children
pursue higher education. 8 Next, this comment will discuss some
practical problems inherent in the efforts of California legislators.' 9
Finally, this comment will propose an alternative to the solutions
contained in the proposed legislation. 20 First, however, the pattern
of postmajority educational support must be placed in historical
perspective.
for minor child or for adult child who is unable to be self-sufficient). Consequently, the
reduction in the statutory age of majority left courts without authority to order support for
postsecondary students, who are usually beyond the age of majority.
12. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 58047 (1984) (provision may be made for the support,
maintenance, and education of an adult or minor child); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (court may make provision for education of children, whether of
minor or majority age); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1981) (support obligations may
include support for child who is between 18 and 22 years of age, who is a full-time student
in a college or university). See also infra notes 76-102 and accompanying text (discussing the
trend in statutory development of postmajority educational support obligations).
13. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Paul, 173 Cal. App. 3d 913, 918, 219 Cal. Rptr. 318,
320-21 (1985) (permitting increase in spousal support due to voluntary contributions to child's
college education).
14. See S.B. 1129, supra note 7; S.B. 2065, supra note 7. Both S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065
died in committee at the end of the 1985-86 legislative session. Id. Since either bill may be
reintroduced in a later session, or a similar measure may be proposed, consideration of the
two bills has not been rendered moot by virtue of the fact that neither bill passed.
15. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, at sec. 1; S.B. 2065, supra note 7, at sec. 2. See also infra
text accompanying notes 145-66 (description and analysis of the recent senate bills).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 145-211.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 145-66.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 108-44.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 167-99.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 200-11.
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THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS IN CALIFORNIA
California courts may order parents to support their minor children
to the extent necessary for maintenance and education. 2' The level
of support ordered for educational purposes varies according to the
circumstances of a given case. 22 California courts, however, are not
expressly empowered to order child support specifically for postsec-
ondary education. 23
In the past, at least one California appellate court was reluctant
to recognize a parental obligation to provide postsecondary education
to children. 24 Gradually, however, courts began characterizing post-
secondary education as a "necessary ' 25 under some circumstances. 26
Support orders for college education in divorce actions were affirmed
routinely as being within the proper exercise of trial court discretion. 27
Consistent with the statutory limitations placed on the power of
21. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1986). "In any proceeding where there is at issue
the support of a minor child ... the court may order either or both parents to pay any
amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child." Id. See also
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 110 Cal. App. 2d 663, 665, 243 P.2d 79, 81 (1952) (court may order
support for minor child).
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1982) (father and mother have an equal responsibility
to support and educate child in manner suitable to child's circumstances, taking into account
respective earning capacities of parents). See also In re Marriage of Aylesworth, 106 Cal. App.
3d 869, 878, 165 Cal. Rptr. 389, 394 (1980) (ordering parent to pay private school tuition).
23. At present, the California Civil Code contains no provision expressly authorizing
courts to order parents to support their children during postsecondary education apart from
whatever authority might be implied from the provisions of Civil Code § 4700, which applies
only to support of minor children or adult children incapable of being self-sufficient. See
supra note 21 (text of Civil Code § 4700).
24. See, e.g., Boens v. Bennett, 20 Cal. App. 2d 477, 482, 67 P.2d 715, 718 (1937). In
Boens, the court concluded education beyond that provided by the state is a matter of parental
discretion, and that a father is under no legal duty to give a child over 16 years of age a
college education. Id.
25. Necessaries are "[t]hings indispensable, or things proper and useful for sustenance of
human life ... includ[ing] not only those services which are proper and required to sustain
life but also those suitable for the individual involved according to his circumstances and
condition in life." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 927 (5th ed. 1979). Accord Daubert v. Mosley,
487 P.2d 353, 356 (Okla. 1971) ("necessaries" is a relative, somewhat flexible term, depending
upon social position, and the child's fortune and situation in life); In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d
513, 521, 468 P.2d 204, 208, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (1970) (minor is entitled to be maintained
in a style and condition consonant with parent's financial ability and position in society).
26. See, e.g., Howton v. Howton, 51 Cal. App. 2d 323, 325-26, 124 P.2d 837, 838-39
(1942) (inferentially supporting assertion that college is a necessary by permitting reservation
of child's earnings for college tuition).
27. See Rawley v. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d 562, 565, 210 P.2d 891, 893 (1949); Hale v.
Hale, 55 Cal. App. 2d 879, 882, 132 P.2d 67, 69 (1942). Cf. Straub v. Straub, 213 Cal. App.
2d 792, 798, 29 Cal. Rptr. 183, 187 (1963) (permitting modification of support award due to
increased expenses incurred when child began attending a university).
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courts to order child support,28 these educational support orders were
confined to the duration of the minority of the children involved.
29
The change in the age of majority in California has had a profound
impact on the ability of courts to require parents to provide their
children with postsecondary education. Effective March 4, 1972, the
age of majority in California was reduced from twenty-one to eight-
een years of age.30 Most children attain the age of eighteen about
the time they commence postsecondary study. 3' The reduction in the
statutory age of majority, without a corresponding adjustment of
the support obligations of parents, virtually eliminated the authority
of courts to enter support awards for postsecondary education.
The reduction in the age of majority also created confusion over
the effect of the new age on preexisting support orders.3 2 The
California Supreme Court, in Ganschow v. Ganschow, 33 resolved this
confusion. In Ganschow, contempt proceedings had been brought
against a father who ceased making support payments for his twenty-
year-old child once the statutory age of majority was reduced to
eighteen years.3 4 The court determined the legislature had intended
that the statutory reduction in the age of majority should have no
effect on orders for child support entered prior to March 4, 1972. 31
The court also indicated that a preexisting order subject to amend-
ment could refer to the reduced age of majority in subsequent
modifications. 6 Although the order requiring the father to continue
28. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1986). California courts are empowered to enter
orders of support under § 4700 only for minor children or adult children who are unable to
be self-sufficient. Id.
29. Rawley, 94 Cal. App. 2d at 565, 210 P.2d at 893; Hale, 55 Cal. App. 2d at 882, 132
P.2d at 69.
30. CAL. Civ. CODE § 25.1 (West 1982).
The Legislature intends that any use of or reference to the words "age of majority,"
"age of minority," "adult," "minor," or words of similar intent in any instrument,
order, transfer, or governmental communication whatsoever made in this state: ...
(b) On or after March 4, 1972, shall make reference to persons 18 years of age and
older, or younger than 18 years of age.
Id.
31. See supra note 9.
32. See In re Marriage of Phillips, 39 Cal. App. 3d 723, 728, 114 Cal. Rptr. 362, 364
(1974) (considering whether reduction in statutory age of majority effected existing child
support order for son who had reached age 18); In re Marriage of Crookshanks, 41 Cal. App.
3d 475, 479, 116 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1974) (considering whether reduction in statutory age of
majority terminated child support obligation owed for 18-year-old "by operation of law").
33. 14 Cal. 3d 150, 534 P.2d 705, 120 Cal. Rptr. 865, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 887
(1975).
34. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d at 153, 534 P.2d at 706, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
35. Id. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.1 (West 1982) (orders entered prior to March 4,
1972, concerning minor children refer to children under 18 years of age).
36. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d at 157, 534 P.2d at 709, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
paying support for his adult daughter who was in college was
affirmed,3 7 the California Supreme Court did not decide whether
parents can be compelled to provide postsecondary education to their
adult children in the absence of a preexisting order to this effect.' 8
In Messier v. Messier,39 the California Court of Appeal avoided
the question of whether the parental obligation to provide education
extends beyond majority, even though the trial court had intimated
that the obligation to pay educational expenses is not limited to the
duration of the child's minority.40 No reported cases have been located
in California in which the courts acknowledge the existence of a
parental obligation to provide adult children with postsecondary
education. 4' Nevertheless, several California courts have imposed this
obligation upon parents indirectly by altering spousal support ar-
rangements to enable parents to assist adult children with postsec-
ondary education. 42
Since the age of majority was reduced, California courts have
impliedly endorsed the notion that parents should provide postsec-
ondary education for their children. 43 In 1976, the California Court
of Appeal permitted the father of a college-bound child to reduce
the spousal support paid to his former wife, in part because of
37. Id. at 162, 534 P.2d at 712, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
38. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d 150, 534 P.2d 705, 120 Cal. Rptr. 865. Nowhere in the opinion
did the court specifically address this question. See id.
39. 62 Cal. App. 3d 595, 133 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1976).
40. Messier, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (quoting trial court's opinion
that an order for educational expenses is not limited to the duration of minority).
41. An examination of the reported opinions in California reveals no cases in which
parents have been required to provide their adult children with postsecondary education, absent
an express agreement to do so, except when the child is still in high school. If the child is
still in high school, unmarried, and under 19 years of age, the parental obligation to provide
support continues. CAL. CIv. CODE § 196.5 (West Supp. 1986). Accord Rebensdorf v.
Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143, 215 Cal. Rptr. 76, 79 (1985) (incapacity of 18-year-
old remaining in high school due to parents' decision to have him held back presents triable
issues of fact).
42. See In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 90, 592 P.2d 1165, 1173-74, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 413, 421-22 (1979) (daughter's college expenses could be considered as factor affecting
ability of father to pay spousal support); In re Marriage of Paul, 173 Cal. App. 3d 913, 921,
219 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322 (1985) (trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
voluntary contributions to children's college expenses as factor in assessing request for modi-
fication of spousal support award); In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 95, 134
Cal. Rptr. 259, 266 (1976) (permitting reduction in amount of spousal support owed due to
anticipated expenses flowing from daughter's enrollment in college).
43. See, e.g., Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d at 90, 592 P.2d at 1173-74, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22
(permitting consideration of college expenses in making spousal support award); Kelley, 64
Cal. App. 3d at 95, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (permitting reduction in spousal support award due
to college expenses).
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additional expense anticipated from the child's enrollment in college. 44
Three years later, the California Supreme Court held that in deter-
mining the amount of spousal support to be awarded, the trial court
had not abused its discretion by considering expenses incurred in
meeting the cost of a college education for a child who was eighteen
years of age. 45 The California Court of Appeal recently came even
closer to requiring a father to provide postsecondary education to
his adult children in Marriage of Paul.46
In Paul, the trial court failed to consider the mother's expenditures
on college tuition and related costs for her adult children as a factor
in establishing her need for increased spousal support. 47 The appellate
court found that this failure was an abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court.48 Consequently, the appellate court effectively
compelled the father to subsidize the postsecondary education of his
adult children through payment of increased spousal support. 49
The California Supreme Court has recognized that at common law
parents had no duty to support adult children.50 By statute, however,
parents have a duty to maintain a child who is unable to be self-
sufficient." California courts have yet to characterize those persons
pursuing postsecondary education as "needy" within the statutory
meaning.52 Instead, California is endeavoring to take a less radical
approach to the lack of parental support for postsecondary education.
Recently, legislation designed to lessen the perceived inequities be-
tween the educational support afforded children of intact families
44. Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 95, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 266. The court further reduced
spousal support because of the former wife's increased ability to be self-sufficient, but the
anticipated college expenses were responsible for the initial reduction. Id.
45. Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d at 90, 592 P.2d at 1173-74, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22.
46. 173 Cal. App. 3d 913, 219 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1985).
47. Paul, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
48. Id. at 921, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
49. See id.
50. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 718 n.4, 388 P.2d 720,
721 n.4, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 489 n.4 (1964), vacated, 380 U.S. 194 (1965). Accord Fresno
County v. Walker, 115 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 171 Cal. Rptr. 572, 578 (1981). But cf. Levy
v. Levy, 245 Cal. App. 2d 341, 363, 53 Cal. Rptr. 790, 803 (1966) (child support obligation
terminates at majority unless child is incapable of self-support).
51. CAL. Civ. CODE § 206 (West 1982). "It is the duty of the father, the mother, and
the children of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain
such person to the extent of their ability." Id. Cf. Bryant v. Swoap, 48 Cal. App. 3d 431,
437, 121 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872 (1975) (duty of support persists after majority if child is needy).
52. Although those who are pursuing postsecondary education may be in a poor position
to maintain themselves as a practical matter, no reported California opinions have been located
in which courts are willing to characterize postsecondary students as "needy" persons.
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and that received by children from dissolved marriages has been
proposed.13
A senate bill designed to alter certain provisions of the California
Civil Code, giving California courts discretion to order child support
payments to continue past the age of majority for children pursuing
postsecondary education, was introduced in the California Legislature
on March 7, 1986. 4 On February 19, 1986, a second bill dealing
with postsecondary support was introduced in the California Senate.5
This bill was intended to achieve approximately the same result as
its predecessor.5 6 The method employed differs considerably, however,
in that the second bill does not require that courts ordering postsec-
ondary educational support first find that parents would have assisted
their children but for the marital dissolution. 7
The evolution of educational support obligations in California
began with early reluctance to require parents to provide postsecond-
ary education for their children, even during minority when basic
support obligations continue.5 8 The trend eventually turned toward
requiring parents to provide postsecondary education for minor chil-
dren. 9 Recent efforts to impose a statutory obligation upon divorced
parents to provide postsecondary education to their adult children
under certain circumstances have gained momentum! 0 These efforts,
however, invite considerable scrutiny of their constitutionality and
practicality. 6' Furthermore, the California Legislature has overlooked
at least one preferable alternative employed by other jurisdictions
that have legislated in this area.6 2
53. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 1. The California Legislature has found that "the
children of parents whose marriage has been dissolved often face disadvantages with respect
to the payment of educational expenses beyond the age of 18 not experienced by children in
intact families." Id.
54. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 1. See infra text accompanying notes 149-59 (discussing
the ramifications of Senate Bill 1129).
55. S.B. 2065, supra note 7.
56. See id. at Legislative Counsel's Digest (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
57. Compare S.B. 2065, supra note 7 with S.B. 1129, supra note 7. S.B. 1129 does require
that courts make a finding that but for the parents separation or the dissolution of their
marriage they would have assisted their child with postsecondary education. Id. sec. 4.
58. See supra text accompanying note 24.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 149-99 (discussing the constitutionality and prac-
ticality of Senate Bills 1129 and 2065).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 200-11 (discussing superiority of a dependency
approach).
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SELECTED COMPARATIVE PRACTICES
In most jurisdictions, child support awards for purposes of post-
secondary education evolved through a progression similar to the
development that took place in California. 63 At the turn of the
century, courts in other states were hesitant to order payment of
postsecondary educational expenses when issuing child support or-
ders. 64 The judiciary eventually began characterizing postsecondary
education as a "necessary ' 65 under some circumstances. 66 Conse-
quently, a number of jurisdictions began including payment for
postsecondary education in child support awards.67
The judiciary used a variety of devices to insure that parents
ordered to make child support payments for postsecondary education
retained funds sufficient to meet these obligations after their mar-
riages were dissolved. 68 Noncustodial parents commonly were ordered
to establish a trust fund for use by their children when the time
came to commence postsecondary study.69 Courts in certain jurisdic-
63. See supra text accompanying notes 21-60 (evolutionary progression in California).
64. See, e.g., Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570, 576, 43 A. 904, 907 (1899) (a
common education is a moral and social necessity but professional training is not). Accord
Halsted v. Halsted, 239 N.Y.S. 422, 424 (1930). Cf. Morris v. Morris, 171 N.E. 386, 387
(Ind. Ct. App. 1930) (en banc) (general college education is not a "necessary").
65. See supra note 25 (definition of "necessary").
66. See Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 182, 244 P. 264, 267 (1926). See also Pass v.
Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 458, 118 So. 2d 769, 773 (1960) (parent required to pay for minor child's
college education when child qualified for college); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J. Super. 26, 30, 69
A.2d 752, 754 (App. Div. 1949) (court could order payment of support for college in family
for which college attendance would be usual); Hart v. Hart, 30 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Iowa 1948)
(father required to provide college education to sons because college education was appropriate).
67. See, e.g., Lund v. Lund, 96 N.H. 283, 284, 74 A.2d 557, 558 (1950); Hart, 30 N.W.2d
at 750; Cohen, 82 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1948); Esteb, 138 Wash. at 185,
244 P. at 268.
68. Sensitivity to the need for family privacy has led courts to refrain from intervening
in the affairs of intact families, especially in matters of education. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (refusing to permit state to require Amish parents to send their
children to secondary school). Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (act
requiring parents to send their children exclusively to public school held unconstitutional);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding right to teach foreign language to children
in parochial school). See also Comment, Post Majority Educational Support: Is There an
Equal Protection Violation?, 6 U. HAW. L. Rv. 225, 243-44 (1984) (discussing the effect of
the family privacy doctrine on educational support determinations).
69. Herzmark v. Herzmark, 199 Kan. 48, 50-51, 427 P.2d 465, 467-68 (1967); Bryant v.
Bryant, 68 Wash. 2d 97, 101, 411 P.2d 428, 430-31 (1966); Posselt v. Posselt, 271 Minn. 575,
576, 136 N.W.2d 659, 661 (1965); Deigaard v. Deigaard, 114 So. 2d 516, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1960); Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Wash.
204, 212, 298 P. 318, 321 (1931). But cf. Rosenheimer v. Rosenheimer, 63 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13,
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tions ordered parents to purchase insurance policies so that the
availability of funds for education would be assured in the event of
the death of the parent under order to provide postsecondary edu-
cation.70 Other courts merely ordered parents to continue periodic
support payments while their children pursued higher education. 71
The reduction in the age of majority following the ratification of
the twenty-sixth amendment 72 had a detrimental effect on support
awards for postsecondary education. 73 Courts in many states were
forced to resort to incorporating voluntary agreements made by
divorcing parents into divorce decrees to assure support for young
adults pursuing higher education. 74 In recent years, several state
legislatures have proffered solutions to this judicial impotence by
passing legislation empowering the courts to order that educational
support payments continue beyond the age of majority. 7 -
Although many jurisdictions impose postmajority support obliga-
tions upon all parents of children who are indigent or handicapped, 76
laws dealing with postmajority educational support obligations typi-
cally apply only in marital termination cases. 77 Laws empowering
216 N.W.2d 25, 30 (1974) (reversing order requiring father to establish educational trust for
daughter's college education); Kunc v. Kunc, 186 Okla. 297, 302, 97 P.2d 771, 776 (1939)
(reversing dismissal of petition to vacate decree requiring payment into fund for use after
child's majority).
70. See, e.g., Fender v. Fender, 265 S.C. 399, 408, 182 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1971) (father
required to purchase insurance policy). But cf. Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 602, 363
P.2d 795, 802 (1961) (parent not bound to continue policy beyond child's majority).
71. See, e.g., Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 626, 178 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1971) (support
pursuant to consent decree ordered to continue during postsecondary education). In this type
of case the obligation to continue child support during postsecondary education often was
contingent upon whether the supporting parent shared control over the child's choice of school
or curriculum. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. The twenty-sixth amendment, ratified in 1971, provides
in pertinent part that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age." Id.
73. E.g., Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 430 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Miller
v. Miller, 67 Wis. 2d 435, 439, 227 N.W.2d 626, 628 (1975); Beaudry v. Beaudry, 132 Vt. 53,
58, 312 A.2d 922, 925 (1973); Bernhardt v. Bernhardt, 283 So. 2d 226, 228 (La. 1973).
74. Scott v. Scott, 401 So. 2d 92, 95 (Ala. Ct. App. 1981); Hoar v. Hoar, 404 So. 2d
1032, 1034-35 (Miss. 1981); Jameson v. Jameson, 306 N.W.2d 240, 244 (S.D. 1981); Holmes
v. Holmes, 384 So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Grant v. Grant, 60 Ohio App.
2d 277, 282, 396 N.E.2d 1037, 1040-41 (1977).
75. HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28
(West Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108 (1983).
76. Moore, Parents' Support Obligations to Their Adult Children, 19 AKRON L. REV.
183, 184 (1985). Thirty jurisdictions impose support obligations upon the parents of indigent
adult children. Nineteen require support only when the child is physically or mentally handi-
capped. Id.
77. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-
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courts, either explicitly or implicitly, to order support for adult
children pursuing postsecondary education can be divided into two
broad categories: statutes that impose an age ceiling7S and statutes
that do not. 79 Within these broad categories are subcategories con-
taining conditions upon which the parental support obligations are
contingent.
Among the laws imposing age ceilings, specific criteria may be
required to give rise to the parental support obligation. The Iowa
statute, for instance, conditions an award of educational support
upon good-faith, full-time attendance at an appropriate school.8 0
Similarly, the Oregon provision requires regular attendance at a
school of a specific description.' In contrast, the Massachusetts law
requires only that the child be domiciled with and principally de-
pendent upon a parent.8 2
The laws that impose no age ceiling on the parental obligation to
provide postsecondary education are rather circumspect about re-
quiring specific criteria to be met.8 3 The Hawaii statute empowers
courts to provide for the education of an adult or a minor child. 4
Moreover, application for educational support need not be made
before the child has attained majority. 85 The first part of the Illinois
statute8 6 is substantially identical to the Hawaii provision.87 The
Hurd Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
§ 28 (West Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (1986).
78. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1981) (22 years); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
208, § 28 (West Supp. 1986) (21 years); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108 (1983) (21 years).
79. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.17a (West Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.100 (1986).
80. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West 1981). The Iowa statute provides in pertinent part:
[Support] obligations may include support for a child who is between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-two years who is regularly attending an approved school in
pursuance of a course of study leading to a high school diploma or its equivalent,
or regularly attending a course of vocational training ... or is, in good faith, a
full-time student in a college, university or area school ....
Id.
81. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108 (1981). The Oregon provision applies to children between
18 and 21 years of age and requires regular attendance at a school, community college, college,
or university or at a course of vocational or technical training designed to prepare the child
for gainful employment. The Oregon provision also requires that the child be unmarried. Id.
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West Supp. 1986).
83. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.17a (West Supp. 1986); -vASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.100 (1986).
84. HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1984).
85. Id.
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
87. Id. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1984).
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Illinois statute, however, goes on to require that courts consider all
relevant factors in ordering support. 8 Additionally, the Illinois statute
has been applied by at least one court to require a father to pay the
cost of his child's professional education, beyond the basic college
education. 89
The Michigan9° and Washington9 support statutes are devoid of
specific criteria upon which the parental support obligation rests.
Case decisions, therefore, have provided the parameters within which
postmajority educational support awards can be made in these two
states.92 In cases involving exceptional circumstances, Michigan courts
may require payment of support to a child who has reached the age
of majority. 93 Postsecondary education was characterized as an ex-
ceptional circumstance within the statutory meaning by a Michigan
court in Price v. Price.94
The Washington statute similarly lacks specific criteria upon which
the postmajority support obligations rest. The statute provides for
continuation of support past majority for children who are "de-
pendent" upon either or both parents. 9 The Supreme Court of
Washington defined the term "dependent" in Childers v. Childers.96
In Childers, the trial court in a dissolution proceeding ordered the
husband to pay support for his three sons during their college
attendance, which extended four years beyond the age of majority. 97
The 1973 Dissolution of Marriage Act98 had substituted "dependent
children" for "minor children" in the Washington support statute.99
The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that through this substi-
tution the legislature intended to change the rigid and arbitrary status
88. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). The statute specifically
enumerates three factors: (1) the financial resources of both parents; (2) the standard of living
the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (3) the financial resources
of the child. Id.
89. In re Marriage of Edelstein, 82 I1l. App. 3d 574, 577, 403 N.E.2d 323, 326 (1980).
90. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 552.17a (West Supp. 1986).
91. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (1986).
92. See, e.g., Price v. Price, 395 Mich. 6, 11 n.5, 232 N.W.2d 630, 632-33 n.5 (1975)
(college education comes within purview of support statute as "exceptional circumstances");
Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 601, 575 P.2d 201, 207 (1978) (en banc) (divorced
parent may have duty of support for college education if duty works no significant hardship
on parent and child shows aptitude for college work).
93. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.17a (West Supp. 1986).
94. 395 Mich. 6, 11 n.5, 232 N.W.2d 630, 632-33 n.5 (1975).
95. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100 (1986).
96. 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (en banc).
97. Id. at 594, 575 P.2d at 203.
98. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09 (West 1986).
99. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d at 595, 575 P.2d at 204.
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embodied in the concept of minority, preferring instead a flexible
fact-oriented status.' °° The court found the determination that the
Childers boys were in fact dependent was properly within the discre-
tion of the trial court.' 0 ' Finally, the Washington court concluded
that a divorced parent may owe a duty of support for postsecondary
education, provided this duty does not work a significant hardship
upon the parent, and the child shows an aptitude for higher educa-
tion. 02 The decision in Childers, therefore, has effectively transmuted
the Washington dependency statute into a tool for providing support
to adults during postsecondary education.
Case law in several other states also reflects the trend toward
requiring divorced parents to provide their adult children with post-
secondary education.0 3 Although a few states have steadfastly refused
to recognize a parental duty to provide postsecondary education, 104
California has contemplated legislation designed to impose this type
of duty upon divorced parents. 05 The California Legislature, how-
ever, must consider carefully the ramifications of a legislative scheme
with this design, for the trend toward establishing a parental obli-
gation to provide postsecondary education to adult children has been
challenged on equal protection grounds.10 Moreover, the formula-
tions recently proposed in California suffer from some inherent
defects apart from the potential constitutional violations. 0 7
CHALLENGING THE TREND
The trend toward imposing an obligation on parents to provide
postsecondary education to their adult children has met with consti-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 598, 575 P.2d at 205.
102. Id. at 601, 575 P.2d at 207.
103. E.g., Heinze v. Heinze, 122 N.H. 358, 360, 444 A.2d 559, 561 (1982) (parent ordered
to support daughters so long as they continue in college); In re Marriage of Goodrich, 622
S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (college expenses are properly considered as bearing
upon the amount of child support); Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J. Super. 441, 448, 400 A.2d 1233,
1237 (1979) (father required to continue child support payment for daughter throughout law
school).
104. Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342, 344 (R.I. 1983); Peterson v. Peterson, 319 N.W.2d
414, 414 (Minn. 1982); Torma v. Torma, 645 P.2d 395, 397-98 (Mont. 1982); Kern v. Kern,
360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
105. See S.B. 1129, supra note 7; S.B. 2065, supra note 7.
106. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (en banc); In.re Vrban,
293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
107. See infra notes 168-99 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities of the bills and
the potential for speculative and arbitrary results).
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tutional challenges founded upon equal protection grounds. 08 The
statutory formulations recently proposed in California, designed to
impose such an obligation, invite similar challenges.'0 9
A. Equal Protection
Laws that discriminate on the basis of class distinctions invite
constitutional challenges based on equal protection guarantees.' 1°
Laws designed to impose an obligation upon parents to provide their
adult children with postsecondary education have the potential to
discriminate on three bases: the marital status of the parents,"' the
affluence of the parents," 2 and the intellect of the child." 3 Two of
the support statutes discussed earlier have been subjected to consti-
tutional scrutiny as a result of assertions that they discriminate based
on marital status.'4
In Childers v. Childers,"5 the Washington Supreme Court found
that the Washington statute imposing a duty on parents to support
their dependent children, regardless of age, did not contravene the
equal protection clause. 16 Similarly, in Marriage of Vrban," 7 the
108. See Childers, 89 Wash. 2d at 604, 575 P.2d at 209; Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 202.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 154-66 (discussing the potential equal protection
challenges to Senate Bills 1129 and 2065).
110. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. Most of the statutes reviewed that impose a parental obligation to provide child
support during postsecondary education discriminate on the basis of marital status because
they apply only to support obligations arising out of the termination of marital relationships.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
112. The potential discrimination based on affluence derives from the fact that the financial
status of the parent upon whom the obligation may be imposed is a major factor considered
by courts when ordering support for postsecondary education. See, e.g., Kerr v. Kerr, 278
S.C. 191, 193, 293 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (1982) (considering parent's financial ability to help
pay for education); Rankin v. Bobo, 410 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (Miss. 1982) (child is entitled to
attend college in accord with family standards if father is financially able to assist with college
expenses). In rendering support orders, however, courts traditionally have discretion to consider
the financial circumstances of the parties. See Bernard v. Bernard, 79 Cal. App. 2d 353, 358,
179 P.2d 625, 628 (1947); Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 434, 437, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47-48 (Sup.
Ct. Spec. Term 1978); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,,
para. 513 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
113. The potential for discrimination based on intellect results from the admission require-
ments of postsecondary educational institutions. Intelligence classifications, however, are not
suspect within the context of equal protection and thus are entitled to an intermediate level
of constitutional scrutiny only. See infra text accompanying note 128 (discussing intermediate
level scrutiny). See also Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence Classifications, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 647, 672 (1974).
114. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d at 605, 575 P.2d at 209 (challenging the constitutionality of
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.100); Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 202 (challenging the constitutionality
of Iowa Code § 598.1).
115. 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (en banc).
116. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d at 605, 575 P.2d at 209.
117. 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
390
1987 / Supporting Education
Supreme Court of Iowa determined that the Iowa statute defining
support obligations to include a parental obligation to provide post-
secondary education did not violate the equal protection clause." 8 In
both cases the courts used a rational relationship standard." 9
1. The Standard of Review
a. U.S. Constitution
The expression "equal protection of the laws ' ' 20 is not susceptible
to precise definition.' 2' As a result, divergent standards of review
have emerged under the equal protection clause. The traditional
standard of review was extremely deferential, requiring only that
questioned legislation have a reasonable basis.' 22 Eventually, a two-
tiered equal protection approach became prevalent. 2 3 Although the
courts continued to apply the deferential standard to statutes regu-
lating economic or social interests, a stricter standard was applied in
exceptional cases. 24 The "strict scrutiny" standard required that
states show a compelling interest in the subject of the challenged
statute. 25 Strict scrutiny was applied to cases in which legislation
implicated a suspect classification 26 or impacted upon a fundamental
interest. 27
118. Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 202.
119. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d at 605, 575 P.2d at 209; Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 202. The
rational relationship standard measures the relationship of a legislative scheme against a state
interest, culminating in a finding of constitutionality if the legislative scheme is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. Id.
120. The expression "equal protection of the laws" comes from the fourteenth amendment,
which provides in pertinent part as follows: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); Magoun v. Illinois
Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898).
122. E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
123. Veron, Parental Support of Post-Majority Children in College: Changes and Chal-
lenges, 17 J. FAi. L. 645, 671 (1978-79).
124. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the use of suspect classifications).
125. Veron, supra note 123, at 671.
126. Suspect classifications are typified by discrete and insular minorities who are under-
represented politically, and who often share immutable characteristics in common. See United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Examples of suspect
classifications include those based on alienage or race. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage classification concerning welfare benefits challenged); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (race as a factor in public school education). But see Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (permitting consideration of race as factor
in medical school admissions program).
127. Fundamental interests include voting, criminal appeals, interstate travel, and privacy.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(criminal appeals); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy).
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Today, this two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis ob-
tains, although some jurists have propounded an intermediate level
of scrutiny in cases concerning quasi-suspect classes or quasi-funda-
mental interests. 128 For consideration of the constitutional validity of
postsecondary support obligations, however, this distinction is insig-
nificant because the lowest level of scrutiny, bare rational relation-
ship, applies to statutes affecting the financial interests of parents.
29
A statute is presumed to be constitutionally valid when no funda-
mental interest or suspect classification is involved. 30 The individual
challenging the statute has the burden of demonstrating that the
statute bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative pur-
pose.' 3' A state legislature, therefore, need not establish the consti-
tutionality of a proposed statute.
b. California Constitution
The California State Constitution includes an equal protection
provision similar to that of the United States Constitution.3 2 The
standards of review are substantially the same under both provi-
sions.'I The tests used to interpret the California provision are the
same as the tests used to define equal protection under the United
States Constitution.'34 Consequently, legislation imposing an obliga-
tion on parents to provide postsecondary education to their adult
children, to the extent that the legislation classifies on the basis of
128. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). Quasi-suspect classes and quasi-
fundamental interests require greater scrutiny than nonsuspect classes or nonfundamental
interests, but the standard of review does not approach strict scrutiny. Id. Typically, gender-
based legislation has been subjected to this mid-level scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender-based differential in law governing purchase of beer constitutes
invidious discrimination); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (discussing
invidious discrimination due to sex-based classifications in Air Force benefits). Cf. Baker v.
Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337-38 (1986) (homosexuals
do not constitute quasi-suspect class). Quasi-fundamental interests derive from constitutional
protections that are not considered fundamental. Id.
129. Ganschow v. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d 150, 158, 534 P.2d 705, 709-10, 120 Cal. Rptr.
865, 869-70, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 887 (1975). See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981).
130. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938); Lindsley, 220
U.S. at 78-79.
131. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-54; Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79.
132. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7. Section 7(a) provides the following: "A person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of
the laws . . . ." Id. Cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I (forbidding states to deny to persons
due process or equal protection of the laws).
133. Reece v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 64 Cal. App. 3d 675, 679, 134
Cal. Rptr. 698, 701 (1976).
134. Id.
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the parents' marital status or affluence, or the child's intellect, would
be subject to a rational relationship test under either United States
or California constitutional standards.
The California Supreme Court, in Ganschow v. Ganschow,'3 5 ap-
plied a rational relationship test in assessing the constitutional validity
of statutory classifications affecting postmajority support.' Pursuant
to a divorce decree entered prior to the reduction in the statutory
age of majority, the trial court in Ganschow ordered a father to
continue paying child support for his daughter while she remained
in college.1 7 At issue was the constitutionality of the distinction in
California Civil Code section 25.1138 between different classes of
parents concerning the support obligations owed to children.' 39 Sec-
tion 25.1 effectively creates two classifications of child support ob-
ligations: one based on orders entered prior to March 4, 1972, which
may continue in effect until the child reaches twenty-one years of
age, and another based on orders entered after March 4, 1972, which
terminate when the child attains age eighteen.' 4°
The California Supreme Court determined that the classifications
created by Civil Code section 25.1 neither infringed fundamental
rights nor affected a suspect class.' 4' Rather, the court characterized
the parental interest affected as a purely monetary interest. 142 The
court, therefore, required only that "[the] statute bear some rational
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose."'' 43 Although
the provisions of Civil Code section 25.1 differ from the provisions
contained in the recently proposed legislation,' 44 California courts
would likely characterize the parental interests affected by the pro-
posed legislation as predominantly monetary, based on the rationale
of the court in Ganschow. Consequently, a Ganschow analysis would
require that a rational relationship test be applied to determine the
constitutionality of the proposed changes pursuant io the equal
135. 14 Cal. 3d 150, 534 P.2d 705, 120 Cal. Rptr. 865, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 887
(1975).
136. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d at 158, 534 P.2d at 709, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
137. Id. at 154, 534 P.2d at 706, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
138. CAL. CiV. CODE § 25.1 (West 1982).





144. Civil Code § 25.1 merely establishes the new age of majority. CAL. CIv. CODE § 25.1
(West 1982). The proposed legislation would, in a sense, create an exception to the age of
majority. See S.B. 1129, supra note 7; S.B. 2065, supra note 7.
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protection guarantees of both the United States and California con-
stitutions.
2. California Legislation
Two senate bills introduced during the 1985-86 regular legislative
sessions reflect the concern of California legislators over the disparity
in parental assistance given to postsecondary students who are chil-
dren of dissolved marriages as compared with that given students
from intact families. 4 Both bills purport to address this disparity
by empowering California courts to order continuation of child
support beyond the age of majority for children pursuing postsec-
ondary education.146 To the extent that the provisions of the bills
create classifications based on marital status, affluence, and intellect,
the bills are subject to equal protection challenges. 47 Moreover, the
statutory changes contemplated under the bills contain ambiguities
and would result in judicial speculation. 48
a. Senate Bill 1129
Senate Bill 1129 (S.B. 1129), in its various permutations, would
alter certain provisions of, and add a section to, the California Civil
Code. 49 The new section would authorize a court to order payment
of support for the costs of maintenance and education of children
after the age of majority.5 0 The court, however, would have to find
that but for the parents' separation or the dissolution of their
marriage the parents would have assisted their adult child with
support during postsecondary education.'' S.B. 1129 also suggests
criteria that may be considered by the court in making this deter-
mination.5 2 These criteria include the following:
(1) the pattern of parental support for education and training
and the pattern of educational attainment of other family members,
including the child's grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles, siblings,
step-siblings and half-siblings;
145. S.B. 1129, supra note 7; S.B. 2065, supra note 7.
146. S.B. 1129, supra note 7; S.B. 2065, supra note 7.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 154-66.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 168-99.
149. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, secs. 2-5. S.B. 1129 would amend §§ 4351, 4700 and 7010
of the Civil Code and add § 4700.8 to the Civil Code. Id.
150. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 4.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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(2) relevant statements or plans made or acquiesced in by the
parent prior to the parents' legal separation or the dissolution of
their marriage;
(3) the professional standing of the parent;
(4) the standard of living of the parent;
(5) the child's commitment to and aptitude for education and
training;
(6) the child's past behavior in pursuing his or her goals for
education or training. 53
These factors suggest class distinctions warranting an equal protection
analysis apart from the challenge invited by the patent discrimination
based on marital status.
Because this new provision would be used to impose postmajority
educational support obligations only on parties to separation or
dissolution actions, the provision discriminates based on marital
status. Furthermore, some of the factors proposed by the legislature
favor children with high intellect and affluent parents by giving them
support, simultaneously disadvantaging the affluent parents by forc-
ing them to provide their children with postsecondary education.
Since neither marital status, intellect, nor affluence are regarded as
suspect classifications for equal protection purposes, the proposed
statute need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative
purpose to be found constitutional.15 4
The California Legislature has asserted that the state and citizens
have a substantial interest in the education of the inhabitants of
California.'" Indeed, higher education has been at the forefront of
economic growth in California. 5 6 To the extent that the legislation
proposed by S.B. 1129 would apply only in cases of marital disso-
lution,' 7 however, S.B. 1129 is not entirely consistent with the
purpose of promoting education. The proposed legislation neverthe-
less may serve a legitimate purpose. Generally, courts and legislators
alike accept the premise that parents whose marriages have been
dissolved are less likely to assist their children with educational
expenses past the age of majority than are parents of intact families. 58
153. Id.
154. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d at 158, 534 P.2d at 709, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
155. Both S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065 contain express findings to this effect made by the
California Legislature. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 1; S.B. 2065, supra note 7, sec. 1.
156. T. HAYDEN, supra note 4, at 1.
157. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 1.
158. In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980); Esteb v. Esteb, 138
Wash. 174, 184, 244 P. 264, 267 (1926); S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 1; S.B. 2065, supra
note 7, sec. 1.
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The logical extension of this premise is that to encourage education,
some accommodation must be made for the disadvantaged children
of dissolved marriages. The proposed statute, therefore, would seem
to bear a rational relationship to the legislative purpose of fostering
education, albeit an indirect relationship. Moreover, a legislative
scheme can withstand equal protection scrutiny even if the scheme
does not offer a solution to the entire problem at which the scheme
is directed. 5 9 The statute proposed by S.B. 1129 should survive an
equal protection attack.
b. Senate Bill 2065
Senate Bill 2065 (S.B. 2065) would add a section to the California
Civil Code.160 The proposed section would permit courts entering or
amending child support awards to provide for continuation of support
payments to any unmarried child who is a full-time student at an
accredited institution of higher learning. 6' Since the purpose of S.B.
2065 is to extend parental child support obligations arising from
marital dissolutions, 62 the proposed legislation will discriminate on
the basis of marital status. Because S.B. 2065 does not prescribe
discriminatory factors to guide judges in making the decision to order
child support for postsecondary education, however, S.B. 2065 is less
offensive to equal protection sensibilities than S.B. 1129.163 The
legislation proposed under S.B. 2065, however, does contain one
limit not found in the provisions of S.B. 1129. S.B. 2065 imposes
an age ceiling of twenty-one years on recipients of postsecondary
educational support awards made pursuant to the proposed provi-
sion.164 Because of this seemingly arbitrary designation of twenty-one
159. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (stating that equal protection
does not require that all evils of the same genus be eradicated); Park & Shop Market, Inc. v.
City of Berkeley, 116 Cal. App. 3d 78, 92, 172 Cal. Rptr. 515, 520 (1981) (equal protection
does not require that all problems of the same type be solved in a single legislative scheme).
160. See S.B. 2065, supra note 7, sec. 2. S.B. 2065 would add § 4709 to the Civil Code.
Id.
161. Id.
162. See Senate Committee on Judiciary, on S.B. 2065, 1985-86, 2nd Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal.
1986).
163. Since S.B. 2065 does not prescribe specific factors, the only patent discrimination
contained in the provisions proposed by S.B. 2065 is on the basis of marital status. Discrim-
ination on the basis of the parents' affluence or the' child's intellect might occur, but will
depend on choices made by individual jurists applying the provisions. The factors embodied
in the S.B. 1129 proposal, however, virtually mandate discrimination on the bases of affluence
and intellect. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
164. S.B. 2065, supra note 7, sec. 2. Cf. S.B. 1129, supra note 7. Although S.B. 1129
does not propose an age ceiling, it does provide that actions be brought before the child for
whom support is sought reaches 23 years of age. Id. sec. 4.
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years as the limit on postsecondary educational support, the ration-
ality of the relationship between the proposed addition and the
legislature's avowed purpose of fostering higher education is rather
dubious. Most children do not complete postsecondary education
until after their twenty-second birthday, and graduate or professional
training usually extends well beyond age twenty-one. 161 Consequently,
the age ceiling precludes meaningful awards by assuring support
sufficient only for three years of postsecondary education. Further-
more, inclusion of the twenty-one year age ceiling strongly suggests
that the true purpose of S.B. 2065 is to restore the circumstances
that existed prior to reduction of the statutory age of majority, rather
than to promote higher education.
When the rationality of legislation is challenged on equal protection
grounds, the judiciary affords great deference to the legislative scheme,
which need not be designed to work a total solution to the problem
addressed. 66 Regardless of the legislative purpose, inclusion of the
twenty-one year age ceiling in the proposed section nevertheless would
enable postsecondary students between eighteen and twenty-one years
of age to secure support. Thus, a partial solution to the educational
disadvantages suffered by children of dissolved marriages would
result. A partial solution in turn would foster higher education
indirectly. For this reason, the formulation suggested under S.B. 2065
probably would survive equal protection scrutiny. Despite this like-
lihood, the proposed statutes would also result in some very adverse
practical effects.
B. Practical Effects of California's Proposed Resolutions
The recent proposals by the California legislature 67 suffer from
inherent defects unrelated to the equal protection challenges they
invite. One defect stems from a latent ambiguity contained in each
of the bills which might be interpreted to create a cause of action
for educational support for adult children from intact families.168 The
other defects are manifested by the speculative and disparate results
that are likely to occur under the proposed legislation. 69
165. See supra note 9.
166. Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 110 (stating that equal protection does not require that
all evils of the same genus be eradicated); Park & Shop, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 520 (equal protection does not dictate that a single legislative scheme be designed to
solve all problems of the same type).
167. S.B. 1129, supra note 7; S.B. 2066, supra note 7.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 170-80.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 181-99.
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1. Legislative Ambiguities
The provisions proposed by both S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065 purport
to limit recovery of postmajority educational support to actions
brought pursuant to the California Family Law Act.'10 California
Civil Code section 4700, the section of the Family Law Act dealing
with orders for support, makes specific reference to California Civil
Code section 206, which establishes a reciprocal duty of support
between parents and children based on need.' 71 To be eligible for
support under section 206, persons seeking support must be unable
to maintain themselves by work. 72 Inability to maintain oneself by
work may be due to a lack of education, or due to the time constraints
posed by the pursuit of education. 73
In Rebensdorf v. Rebensdorf, 74 the California Court of Appeal
determined that questioning whether the status of an individual as a
student creates an inability to be self-sustaining by work presents a
triable issue of fact. 75 The indirect reference to actions under Civil
Code section 206 in the two senate bills consequently leaves open a
tiny avenue by which a postsecondary student might assert a right
to educational support from the student's parents by alleging an
inability to be self-sustaining prior to completion of the postsecondary
education. In Rebensdorf, however, the adult child who sought
support was still in high school because he had repeated the first
grade. 76 The fact that society perceives high school education as
essential 77 and postsecondary education as useful though not vital' 78
undermines the applicability of the Rebensdorf reasoning to issues
concerning postsecondary support obligations. Moreover, one of the
170. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, see. 2; S.B. 2065, supra note 7, sec. 2. Reference to "this
part" in each bill is to the California Family Law Act. See CAL. CIV. CoDE §§ 4000-5174
(West 1983).
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West 1982). The reference to § 206 in the proposed statutes
concerns the authorization of courts to render support orders for children for whom support
is authorized under § 206. Id.
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West 1982).
173. See Rebensdorf v. Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143-44, 215 Cal. Rptr. 76, 79
(1985) (implying that inability to be self-sustaining may result from temporary condition such
as enrollment in educational program).
174. 169 Cal. App. 3d 138, 215 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1985).
175. Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
176. Id. at 143, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
177. Cf. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1978) (making education compulsory for children
through 16 years of age).
178. Cf. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66011 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) (making higher education
available to all qualified California residents without making attendence compulsory).
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purposes of continuing support of a needy child past majority is to
avoid burdening society with the child's support. 79 An individual
without postsecondary education is not necessarily a burden on
society since many jobs require no postsecondary education.
Admittedly, interpreting the provisions of the bills as providing
children from intact families with a cause of action for postsecondary
support against their parents would preclude constitutional challenges
asserting discrimination against parents based on their marital status
because all parents would have the same duty.' 80 This dubious inter-
pretation, however, would not reduce the likelihood of equal protec-
tion challenges on other bases.' 8' Furthermore, courts are generally
reluctant to permit intervention into the affairs of intact families.'
8 2
Thus, any attempt to assert a cause of action for support during
postsecondary education, solely on the strength of the ambiguities
found in S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065, should meet with little success.
2. The Judiciary: Omniscient or Omnipotent?
More dangerous than the legislative ambiguities contained in S.B.
1129 and S.B. 2065 is the threat of speculative and disparate results
should either bill or a similar formulation pass. The statutory changes
proposed by both S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065 would give the judiciary
discretionary authority to order child support payments for adult
children who pursue postsecondary education.8 3 Since discretion tra-
ditionally has played a major part in child support decisions, 84 the
179. Woolams v. Woolams, 115 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 251 P.2d 392, 395 (1952). Accord
Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 145, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 151-59 (discussing discrimination based on marital
status under S.B. 1129); supra text accompanying notes 162-63 (discussing discrimination based
on marital status under S.B. 2065).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 154-59 (discussing discrimination based on intellect
and affluence).
182. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (requiring Amish parents to send
child to school beyond eighth grade held unconstitutional). Interestingly, in Yoder the court
did not address the situation in which the parents and child disagree on school attendence.
See id. Since this would be the situation in cases asserting a cause of action based on the
ambiguities in the two bills, perhaps courts would abandon their reluctance to intervene in
intact families. For if the parents and child are at odds over school attendance, family
disharmony no doubt exists. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state
forbidden to intervene in matters of family privacy concerning contraception). Cf. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (state statute preventing parents from electing
to send their children to private rather than public school held unconstitutional).
183. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 4 ("the court may order"); S.B. 2065, supra note 7,
sec. 2 ("an order for child support ... may provide, or may be amended to provide").
184. See In re Marriage of Aylesworth, 106 Cal. App. 3d 869, 876, 165 Cal. Rptr. 389,
393 (1980) (holding it is well settled that the amount of child support rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
grant of discretion proposed under either senate bill is not, of itself,
an evil. Discretion exercised in conjunction with either the factors
recommended by S.B. 1129 or factors conceived in the minds of
judges, however, requires judicial omniscience, or establishes judicial
omnipotence on the subject of educational opportunities.
S.B. 1129 would require that before ordering postmajority support
for educational purposes, the court must find that but for the parents'
separation or the dissolution of their marriage, the parents would
have provided support for the education of the adult child. 85 Re-
quiring a finding of this type forces courts to speculate on how
parents would have behaved had their marriages survived. S.B. 1129
recommends factors to be considered by the courts in making the
required finding. 8 6 Among these factors are the following: The
pattern of parental support for education; relevant plans; the profes-
sional standing of the parent; the standard of living of the parent;
the child's commitment to and aptitude for education. 187 Since these
factors favor persons from backgrounds suggesting advanced edu-
cation and affluence, they tend to perpetuate the social stratification
that exists as a result of disparate educational opportunities.'88 In
this regard, the recommended factors are undesirable, for they con-
travene the strong policy of promoting equal opportunity prevalent
in this country. 89
The factors recommended in S.B. 1129 admittedly seem relevant
in determining how parents would have conducted themselves if the
family had remained intact. If the intent of the legislature is to
return the family to the predissolution status quo, the provisions of
S.B. 1129 are consistent with that intent. The California Legislature,
however, cannot hope to relieve all of the hardships created by
marital dissolution. Furthermore, the use of these factors does not
185. S.B. 1129, supra note 7, sec. 4.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Historically, a need has existed for special programs, both academic and financial, to
assist persons from families lacking higher education in obtaining the benefits of postsecondary
education. See generally CAL. STUDENT AID COMM'N, FOURTEENTH BIENNIAL REP. (1984). Cf.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (discussing special medical school
admissions programs); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (considering selective law
school admissions programs).
189. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1981) (prohibiting denial of benefits from
federally assisted programs on the basis of immutable characteristics). See also Local No. 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986)
(discussing affirmative action programs); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
Equal Employment Opportuntiy Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (reviewing affirmative action
policies).
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render a determination under S.B. 1129 free from speculation. The
judiciary still would be required to guess at a course of conduct that
would have occured in the future. Indeed, the bill demands judicial
omniscience.
Unlike S.B. 1129, S.B. 2065 does not suggest guidelines under
which the proposed legislation should be used.' 90 The only criteria
included in S.B. 2065 are that the child in question be unmarried
and a full-time student, in good standing, at an accredited institution
of higher learning.,91 Once these two criteria are met, application of
the proposed legislation is left to judicial discretion.' 92 The language
of S.B. 2065 provides no clear guidance regarding what factors ought
to be considered. This deficiency could be corrected easily by incor-
porating guidelines into the provisions of S.B. 2065. The danger, of
course, is in the choice of guidelines. If the legislature were to
incorporate guidelines similar to the factors recommended in S.B.
1129, or the judiciary were to apply similar factors, the same adverse
effects would result. 93
More importantly, S.B. 2065 would result in a kind of judicial
omnipotence in matters of postsecondary educational support for
students from dissolved families. Under the provisions of S.B. 2065,
judges would be free to decide which children should receive support
during postsecondary education using any method, as long as the
decision stops short of an abuse of discretion.' 94 Deciding whether a
child should receive postsecondary support requires a different sort
of inquiry than deciding basic child support issues. In ordering basic
child support, judges are not called upon to decide whether a child
needs food, clothing, shelter, and education, but are only expected
to decide which parents will contribute support and in what amounts. 95
190. See S.B. 2065, supra note 7.
191. Id. sec. 2.
192. Id. Under S.B. 2065, proposed Civil Code § 4709 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an order for child support issued
pursuant to this part may provide, or may be amended to provide, that support
shall continue to be paid as to any unmarried child who is a full-time student during
the academic year, in good standing, in an accredited institution of higher learn-
ing ....
Id. (emphasis added).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89 (discussing speculation and social stratifi-
cation resulting under the provisions of S.B. 1129).
194. See In re Marriage of Aylesworth, 106 Cal. App. 3d 869, 876, 165 Cal. Rptr. 389,
393 (1980).
195. See CAL. CrV. CODE § 196 (West 1982). Parents are required to provide their children
with support and education in a manner suitable to the circumstances of the children, taking
into account the respective earnings or earning capacities of the parents. Imposition of this
duty is not within the discretion of courts. Id.
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The provisions of S.B. 2065, however, do not purport to impose an
absolute obligation upon parents to provide their children with post-
secondary education.19 6 Instead, S.B. 2065 would place imposition of
this obligation within the discretion of the judiciary. 97 The allocation
of this determination to the judiciary tacitly requires a preliminary
inquiry by judges into whether the child ought to receive a postsec-
ondary education before the judge could consider whether the parents
should contribute and in what amounts. Herein lies the grant of
judicial omnipotence in matters of educational opportunity. Conceiv-
ably, a child who otherwise qualifies for relief under the provisions
of S.B. 2065 could be denied postsecondary support simply because
a judge believes further education for the child would be a frivolous
use of the parents' money. 9 8
Admittedly, a conscientious judiciary would probably refrain from
imposing personal educational standards upon others, choosing in-
stead to use the traditional child support standards of need and
ability to pay.' 99 The California Legislature, however, need not rely
on judicial equanimity. S.B. 2065 provides a foundation upon which
the Legislature could build to establish a dependency standard for
postsecondary educational support.
C. Dependency: A Superior Solution
The California Legislature cannot expect to relieve all of the
educational hardships caused by marital dissolution any more than
the legislature can expect to relieve the resultant emotional suffering.
Just as the legislature could not require noncustodial parents to play
ball with their children or spend holidays with them, it cannot
mandate meaningful participation by parents in the postsecondary
education of their children. The legislature, however, does have the
196. The bill does not require the judiciary to order postsecondary support. See S.B. 2065,
supra note 7.
197. Id. See also supra note 181 (identifying language in S.B. 2065 making award discre-
tionary).
198. Appellate courts cannot interfere with trial court child support orders unless, as a
matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown. Aylesworth, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 165
Cal. Rptr. at 393. Review of decisions made on the basis of the personal views of judges,
therefore, is unlikely since an abuse of discretion would not necessarily be apparent in the
result reached by the judge.
199. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Muldrow, 61 Cal. App. 3d 327, 333, 132 Cal. Rptr. 48,
51-52 (1976) (considering needs of children and ability of mother to contribute support); Moore
v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 702, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296 (1969) (applying test that balances
parent's ability to support child against child's legitimate need).
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power to impose an obligation upon parents to support their adult
children who pursue postsecondary education.
200
The methods proposed by the legislature in S.B. 1129 and S.B.
2065 are needlessly deficient because they could be modified to
incorporate a variation of the approach used by other states. Several
states consider two simple factors: the child's capacity for academic
achievement and the parents' financial ability to assist with postsec-
201ondary educational expenses. Indeed, one commentator has pro-
posed a model provision embracing these two factors. 20 2 The utility
of these factors lies in their susceptibility to objective proof without
resort to speculation. One need only produce adequate academic and
financial records to satisfy the court that an educational support
award is warranted. 203 An academic capacity standard, however, is
not particularly egalitarian in a society in which equal opportunity
in education is fundamental. 204
Rather than emphasizing the child's capacity along with the par-
ents' financial ability to provide postsecondary support, California
might adopt a simple dependency standard, substituting a "need"
requirement for the academic capacity* element of the common ap-
proach. Washington applies a dependency standard to require di-
vorced parents to provide postsecondary support when their adult
children are dependent due to the demands of education. 205 Similarly,
the Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the pursuit of education
may render a person dependent. 206 The provisions of S.B. 2065
200. See supra text accompanying notes 120-66 (concluding that California's postsecondary
support schemes will withstand equal protection challenges).
201. E.g., Rankin v. Bobo, 410 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (Miss. 1982); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 116
Misc. 2d 40, 45, 455 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161 (1982); Taylor v. Luntz, 89 I11. App. 3d 278, 282,
411 N.E.2d 950, 954 (1980).
202. Veron, supra note 123, at 684. The model provision was designed to be added to
state statutory schemes governing marriage and divorce. The provision recommends that courts
consider the following factors in making awards for postmajority educational support: (1) the
financial resources of both parents; (2) the financial resources of the child; (3) the standard
of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (4) the child's
abilities and ambitions. Id.
203. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Shapiro, 116 Misc. 2d 40, 42, 455 N.Y.S.2d 157, 159 (1982)
(considering high school counselor's testimony, IQ and SAT test scores, and parents' assets).
204. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345, 367 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (endorsing assertion that education is a
fundamental interest under the California Constitution).
205. See Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (en banc) (applying
dependency standard to award support for college). See also supra notes 96-102 and accom-
panying text (describing Washington's use of a dependency statute to make awards for
postsecondary education).
206. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975). But see Keenan v. Keenan, 440 So.
2d 642, 644-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that no legal duty exists requiring
parents to support healthy adult child).
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contain criteria that are consistent with a dependency approach.2 07
The California Legislature should simply amend S.B. 2065 to mandate
that courts order support to continue for an adult child if, in the
judgment of the court, the child is in fact dependent upon the child's
parents by virtue of enrollment in a course of postsecondary study.
The advantages of a dependency approach are manifold. First,
dependency is a very simple question of fact. 20 8 Dependency can be
proven by objective evidence of the lack of resources and inability
to amass them. In making a determination of dependency, courts
could look to facts such as whether the child lives with a parent,
whether the child works or has financial resources, and whether the
child has marketable skills which could be turned to income without
sacrificing the academic pursuits. 209 Once the child is found to be
dependent, the court could order the parent to contribute to the
child's education, provided that the parent has the financial resources
to contribute without imposing a substantial hardship upon the parent
or other family members. The underlying duty to provide postsec-
ondary support need not depend upon the affluence of the parent,
but the extent of the duty could be limited by ability to pay.
Second, the characterization of the child as factually dependent
bears little relationship to family history concerning educational
attainment. A dependency approach, therefore, is far more egalitarian
than approaches requiring speculation or permitting arbitrary appli-
cation.
A dependency standard, of course, is subject to some of the same
concerns as the approaches contained in S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065.
If the dependency standard were to be construed as permitting courts
to order all parents regardless of marital status to support their
dependent children who are postsecondary students, courts would be
forced to intervene in intact families.2 10 But there is probably very
little family harmony present in the family that includes a child who
207. The provisions of S.B. 2065 would allow orders of postsecondary support only for
unmarried, full-time students. S.B. 2065, supra note 7, sec. 2. These two criteria suggest that
children qualifying for support under the provisions of S.B. 2065 are more likely to be
dependent on their parents than are unqualified married or part-time students.
208. Rebensdorf v. Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143, 215 Cal. Rptr. 76, 79 (1985).
209. Cf. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 598, 575 P.2d 201, 205 (1978) (en banc)
(relying on inability to be self-sustaining and fact that adult sons lived at home to characterize
sons as dependents). Cf. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West Supp. 1986) (requiring
that child entitled to support for postsecondary education be domiciled with and principally
dependent upon a parent).
210. See supra note 180 (demonstrating reluctance of courts to allow intrusion into affairs
of intact families).
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is willing to bring this kind of action and parents who are able but
unwilling to assist the child despite genuine need. Furthermore, indicia
of dependency probably would be absent in a family of this descrip-
tion. The parents likely would not provide the child with support of
any kind once the child attains majority.
If the dependency standard were confined to child support orders
entered pursuant to marital separation or dissolution, discrimination
on the basis of marital status would result. Like the provisions of
S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065 which similarly discriminate, the dependency
approach should withstand constitutional scrutiny.
21
'
A dependency approach is superior to the approaches proposed in
S.B. 1129 and S.B. 2065. The superiority of the dependency approach
stems from the ease with which a dependency determination can be
made on the basis of existing facts. Futhermore, the dependency
approach requires no speculation and leaves little room for abuse of
discretion.
CONCLUSION
The trend toward imposing a parental obligation to provide post-
secondary education has evolved from early rejection to modern
acceptance. With the widespread reduction in the age of majority
that took place in the mid-1970s, states were forced to revise their
statutory schemes so that postsecondary education could be assured
to adult children from dissolved marriages. California most recently
joined this movement by entertaining two senate bills, either of which
would permit courts to order postsecondary support.
California undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in fostering higher
education, as well as in mitigating the educational disadvantages
caused by marital dissolutions. The statutory schemes recently pro-
posed in the California Legislature, aimed at protecting these inter-
ests, probably would withstand equal protection challenges. The
recent proposals, however, require a great deal of speculation by the
judiciary and are thus susceptible to abuse and inconsistency. In
contrast, a statutory scheme emphasizing a flexible dependency ap-
proach would comport with the objectives of fostering higher edu-
cation and mitigating the educational disadvantages caused by marital
dissolutions, without requiring speculation or permitting abuse. If
211. See supra text accompanying notes 151-66 (concluding provisions of bills discriminating
on the basis of marital status will withstand an equal protection challenge).
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the California Legislature must persist in the attempt to mandate
that parents provide their adult children with postsecondary educa-
tion, the legislature should consider the dependency approach. Failing
legislative adoption of a dependency approach, the judiciary should
use a dependency standard in conjunction with whatever legislative
scheme is adopted in California to the extent possible under the
inevitable grant of discretion.
Terry L. Thurbon
